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Abstract:  In January 2012, amendments to California’s corporate code permitted a 
new type of corporate form designed around for-profit entities also wishing to 
commit to serving a broader “social purpose” (or purposes).  Although not the first 
state to embrace such reforms, California’s experiment is unique, in that it allowed 
companies to opt for one of two different social benefit entity forms: the “Benefit 
Corporation” (BC) and the “Flexible Purpose Corporation” (FPC).  This essay 
summarizes the reforms and presents basic descriptive data about the rate at which 
business organizations have embraced them.  Thus far, both forms have had 
relatively modest take-up rates; those social enterprises that have opted for one of the 
two forms have generally favored the BC over the FPC, though its market share 
narrowed consistently during 2012.  Although it is premature to conclude whether 
social enterprise statutes will prove successful, I argue that now is an ideal time to put 
the infrastructure into place for collecting, organizing and analyzing data in this arena 









ew propositions of modern 
corporate law have proven as 
persistent – or as debatable – as 
shareholder primacy: the maxim that corporate 
entities (and managers who control them) 
should focus telescopically on the goal of 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders 
(a.k.a., the corporation’s “residual 
claimants”).   This core tenet (as well as 
variations and violations of it) occupies a 
prominent position in myriad modern 
debates concerning (inter alia) corporate 
governance, fiduciary duties, takeover 
defenses, mergers and acquisitions, proxy 
contests, securities regulation, and even 
criminal law.   
Skeptics of shareholder primacy – 
particularly those concerned with the 
broader role of sustainable business 
practices – have openly questioned the 
wisdom of the judicial commitment to the 
shareholder welfare end, arguing that it 
unjustifiably subordinates considerations 
both of (extra-corporate) societal actors 
and of (intra-corporate) stakeholder actors 
to those of shareholders, whose capital 
stake represents a narrow tranche of the 
economic interests that incorporated 
entities produce.  Moreover, they argue, in 
modern corporate capital structures – rife 
with options, convertible debt, derivatives, 
leverage, and thin equity cushions – 
shareholders can hardly claim distinction as 
the corporation’s sole “residual claimants” 
(and thus the focal beneficiaries of a its 
activities).  Finally, skeptics assert, even if 
one assumed that maximizing shareholder 
welfare should take precedence over other 
intra- and extra-corporate goals, that 
objective does not necessarily equate to 
maximizing shareholder wealth, particularly 
for shareholders who have preferences 
broader than wealth maximization (e.g., 
they care about for public goods, 
environmental sustainability, wealth 
distribution, and so forth).  Our continued 
obsession with shareholder primacy, critics 
conclude, makes little economic, political, 
or philosophical sense.   
Defenders have rejoined that the 
shareholder primacy norm does (or at least 
can) make policy sense, at least for the vast 
majority of corporations where 
shareholders still bear the lion’s share of 
economic risk.  Moreover, they assert, even 
if shareholder primacy does not entirely 
square with the way risks are actually 
distributed within (and outside of) the firm, 
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criterion for holding managers accountable 
– a task that would become hopelessly 
elusive were managers given wide 
discretion to pick and choose which 
constituency (or combination thereof) their 
actions or inactions are meant to serve.  
Finally, defenders argue, if broader social 
purposes were important to shareholders 
(or other corporate constituencies), a profit 
maximizing firm would have a natural 
profit incentive to commit contractually to 
pursuing such purposes as a way to make 
the corporation more attractive as a 
supplier, trading partner or target for 
capital investment.    
By all indications, this now-century-old 
debate will continue to rage on for some 
time, and I do not aspire to resolve it here.  
A fair reading of the current state of play, 
however, suggests that while the 
shareholder primacy norm continues to be 
a valuable organizing theme for some (or 
even most) corporate entities, it is not 
categorically so: Numerous businesses – 
particularly those in environmental 
sustainability industries – would plausibly 
benefit (in a variety of ways) from choosing 
an entity form that commits them to 
broader social purposes alongside profit 
generation.  Accordingly, perhaps, reform-
minded lawyers have endeavored over time 
to conjure up mechanisms by which firms 
might plausibly embrace such goals in a 
credible and durable fashion.  These 
reforms include initiatives to encourage 
corporate social responsibility, innovations 
to judicial doctrine (such as a highly 
protective business judgment rule), and – in 
a number of states – corporate 
“constituency statutes” (which provide 
legal protection for corporate directors 
who wish to weigh stakeholder 
considerations alongside shareholder 
return). 
Recently, however, a different, more 
tailored governance innovation has taken 
hold in a handful of states: the creation of 
alternative corporate forms that require the 
incorporated entity to articulate a broader 
social goal (or goals) against which – 
alongside profitability – corporate 
performance is to be gauged.  These 
alternative forms are designed to provide a 
concrete means by which a corporation can 
bind itself to a broader set of purposes, 
without also having to go “all in” with non-
profit (or low-profit) status.  To date, a 
dozen states have implemented legislation 
creating these new corporate forms (See 
Table 1 below1), and many others are in 
various stages of promulgation.  A national 
experiment is decidedly underway. 
What we still lack, however, is reliable 
information about the experiment’s results.  
This paper attempts to make a modest 
contribution to that enterprise, offering a 
status report on statutory innovations 
across states, and drilling down to focus on 
the data currently available from 
California’s own social enterprise 
experiment, eight months after its effective 
date.   
Why California? After all, its statutory 
reforms are relatively new, coming almost 
two years after Maryland became (in early 
2010) the first state to embrace for-profit 
social purpose entities.  California’s 
experience is still relatively developmental 
compared to other states with a longer 
track record.  That said, the scope of 
California’s reform is notable and worthy 
of our considered attention for at least two 
reasons.  First, California is big, 
geographically and economically, 
comfortably ranking first in the country in 
number of registered firms (incorporated 
or not), employees, and payroll.2  Adding in 
the home-state incorporation bias of non-
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public companies (one that is particularly 
salient in California3), the Golden State’s 
reform decisions simply matter more.  And 
second, California’s reforms are 
tantalizingly unique, in that they provide 
(unlike other states) a menu of social 
enterprise forms, allowing the choice 
among two new alternative business forms 
for social-purpose oriented corporations.  
California corporations now have an option 
between incorporating as a “benefit 
corporation” (BC) a “flexible purpose 
corporation” (FPC), 4 or any of the 
preexisting forms. The intervening months 
have provided an intriguing window for 
assessing not only the extent of demand for 
such new business forms writ large, but 





Before delving into these statutes and 
their effects, however, one must first 
understand why proponents of reform 
thought them necessary in the first 
instance.  Prior to the enactment of 
California’s recent legislation, if a for-profit 
business located in California wished to 
pursue a social benefit mission alongside 
maximizing shareholder returns, it faced 
limited options.  Although many states’ 
statutes permit corporate entities great 
freedom to tailor their corporate purpose 
(as articulated in the charter), including 
social benefit goals,5 an odd quirk in 
California corporate law does not permit 
that type of drafting flexibility.6  Nor, for 
that matter, has California heretofore 
embraced the notion of “constituency” 
statues that have the effect of permitting / 
requiring directors to weigh costs and 
benefits of their decisions across a large 
number of constituencies (including 
shareholders, corporate stakeholders and 
society).7  While incorporating in another 
state (e.g., one allowing tailored corporate 
purposes or offering a constituency statute) 
may be an option, it is not always an 
attractive one for California-based firms, 
who remain beholden to many of the 
California’s corporate provisions anyway, 
by “virtue” (using that term advisedly) of 
its infamous long-arm statute.8  Similarly, 
embracing other socially-oriented business 
forms, such as non-profit status, or L3Cs, 
posed myriad issues related to the explicit 
subordination (or elimination) of profit 
motive, tax considerations, and the 
difficulty of attracting third-party capital 
investments.   
Consequently, prior to the new statutory 
innovations, many (if not most) socially-
minded California businesses tended to 
incorporate as “plain vanilla” C-
corporations, falling back (perhaps 
optimistically) on their managerial 
discretion and the (so-called) business 
judgment rule (“BJR”) – a legal 
presumption that grants great deference to 
fiduciaries in weighing the costs and 
benefits of business decisions, without fear 
of judicial second guessing.  While the 
deference embodied in the BJR is 
comforting, it is also limited in a major 
respect:  While the rule grants fiduciaries 
discretion about how to serve their 
shareholder interests, it does not give 
discretion about whether to do so.  
Consequently, for decisions that obviously 
sacrifice shareholder welfare for the benefit 
of other considerations (including social 
purposes), the BJR provides no protection.  
Such clear tradeoffs are often manifest at 
“watershed” junctures in the life of a 
corporation, such as when a corporate 
entity enters “Revlon” mode, putting itself 
up for sale or reorganization in a fashion 
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that will cause (usually public) shareholders 
to surrender their ability to extract a 
control premium for their shares.9  Here, 
the dictates of corporate law tend to give 
corporate fiduciaries little choice but to 
take appropriate steps to maximize 
shareholders' short term value and accept 
the highest offer reasonably available. Many 
other concerns (including social benefit 
goals) tend to fade quickly when 
scrutinized against this simple judicial 
calculus. 
Finally, even assuming away all the 
above constraints, many reform 
proponents perceived existing corporate 
structures as inadequate means for making  
credible, long-term commitments to a 
social purpose that remains immune to 
“mission creep.”  In other words, if market 
conditions became too tempting or the 
demands of short-termism to pressing, they 
argued, the corporation could too easily re-
define its mission through charter / bylaw 
amendments, restructurings, dissolutions, 
asset sales or acquisitions, abandoning any 
purpose that did not contribute directly to 
attractive quarterly P&Ls.   
Legal reform advocates therefore 
perceived this status quo ante to be 
inadequate for the needs of at least some 
socially-motivated entrepreneurs, their 
employees, and their prospective investors, 
who wished to pursue profitable ventures 
without having to sacrifice their company’s 
defining commitment to a broader social 
goals, such as environmental sustainability, 
public health, and poverty elimination.  
Drawing momentum from the preexisting 
efforts at reform in other states, the 
California BC and FPC statutes were soon 
to follow. 
Although some reform in California 
seemed inevitable, the state’s ultimate 
decision to embrace of two distinct social 
enterprise corporate forms was somewhat 
more surprising.  Although a working 
group focused on stimulating social 
entrepreneurship in California originally 
began drafting unified legislation, the group 
eventually split into two camps. This divide 
persisted, ultimately leading to two bills 
that – while substantially similar in many 
respects – differed in some important ways.  
 
The California Reforms 
 
As noted above, both the BC and FPC 
statutes in California require the 
corporation to articulate in its charter a 
public purpose (or purposes), and to issue 
annual reports on the corporation’s fealty 
to that articulated purpose.  Moreover, 
both statutes require a super-majority vote 
of shareholders (set by default at 2/3) to 
alter, repeal, reorganize out of, or otherwise 
jettison the special purpose provision.  
Nevertheless, the two forms differ in a few 
important respects.  First, FPCs give 
somewhat of a greater freedom to tailor 
and articulate special purposes in the 
charter, while the BC purpose is somewhat 
more structured around a broad social 
purpose, defined as “a material positive 
impact on society and the environment, 
taken as a whole…”10  In addition, the 
statutes differ in the process by which 
fidelity to the broader social purpose is 
measured and assessed.  While both require 
annual reports, assessment within a BC 
must be in accordance with an established, 
documented and measurable third-party 
standard; the FPC form, in contrast, 
permits greater latitude in analyzing 
performance.  Third, embedded in the BC 
statute is also a form of traditional 
constituency statue, requiring the directors 
to consider the impacts of any action or 
proposed action upon various stakeholders 
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of the corporation, such as customers and 
employees.11  The FPC statute does not 
contain a like provision.  Furthermore,  the 
BC statute creates a new type of “Benefit 
Enforcement Proceeding” (filed by a 
director, shareholder, or significant equity 
holder) while the FPC statute relies on 
traditional enforcement rights (and in 
particular the derivative action).   
Moreover, many of the core attributes 
typifying the California BC structure also 
carry over to other states’ benefit 
corporation statutes (albeit with some 
exceptions12) – a similarity generated by the 
national scope of reform-minded 
companies like B-Lab.  
By most accounts, the FPC entails a 
somewhat greater degree of (for want of a 
better term) flexibility on organizational / 
governance dimensions than does the BC 
form, and it therefore represents the more 
modest departure from the traditional 
corporate form.  Such flexibility likely 
brings about both benefits and costs.  As to 
the former, FPCs are more likely to have a 
‘look and feel’ similar to other for-profit 
start-ups, an affinity that may (in some 
circumstances) attract more financing 
interest from sources who value legal 
predictability and familiarity with existing 
corporate legal standards.13  On the other 
hand, by committing to independent third-
party accountability standards and creating 
a new enforcement action, the BC form 
makes an arguably more concrete 
commitment that may (in some 
circumstances) be less susceptible to 
“mission creep.”  A disadvantage that both 
forms face is their novelty, and the lack of a 
well settled jurisprudence clarifying the 
interpretation and application of the 
legislative reforms, as well as the 
development of best practices in the 
operation and management of both firms.  
In this respect, it seems plausible that the 
BC form – by virtue of its relatively more 
established presence other states – is likely 
to generate a more robust quantity of 
judicial opinions in the short to medium 
term.14   Only time will tell, of course, 
which of these relative costs and benefits 




Current State of Affairs 
 
Interesting as all the above speculations 
might be, they will remain speculations 
until we have meaningful data on how 
prospective new businesses have responded 
to legal reforms.   We are now only at the 
cusp of being able to collect, organize and 
analyze this information.  That said, data 
provided by the State of California permit 
some preliminary windows into the current 
state of play.15  What follows is a short 
overview of those data.  I remind readers 
that the social entrepreneurship experiment 
is likely to be in a state of change and flux 
for some time, and accordingly the trends 
identified below are almost certain to 
change as practitioners, judges, and 
business perspectives evolve. 
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Figure 1 provides a count of BC and 
FPC incorporations filed in California 
between January 1 and mid-August, 2012.  
As illustrated by the figure, a total of 75 
corporate entities were organized under 
one of the two new statutes.  Although 
large enough a group to be analyzed 
statistically, this is 
still an extremely 
small number in the 
greater scheme of 
things, massively 
dwarfed by the 
roughly 60,000 new 
incorporations 
occurred overall 
during the same 
period of time in 
California.   
As Figure 1 
further shows, 
entities that chose to 
file under one of the 
two new statutory 
forms preferred the 
BC form on a four-
to-one basis over the 
FPC.  The reasons 
behind this preference 
are as yet unclear, as is 
the question of whether 
this preference will 
persist over time.  
Figure 2 perhaps 
provides a small 
window into this 
question, tracking 
incorporations on a 
monthly basis.  The 
figure suggests that the 
strong preference for 
the BC over the FPC 
was particularly marked 
during the first few 
months in which the statutes were 
effective, possibly suggesting an 
“inventorying” phenomenon, in which 
prospective BCs were already organized 
and lined up for incorporation before the 
statute’s effective date.16  In later months, 
while the BC still appears to be keeping a 
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narrow advantage, the FPC has largely 
increased in popularity while the BC has 
remained somewhat stable.   
Geographic dispersion within (and 
outside of) California is also provides an 
interesting insight into demand for 
alternative forms.  Figure 3 separates the 
new business entities 
by the geographic 
location of their 
headquarters.  As the 
figure demonstrates, 






California.   Of those, 
Northern California 
companies outnumber 
Southern California by 
almost a two-to-one 
ratio.  This greater 
popularity in Northern 
California may be due 






in the Bay Area. 
Given the nature 





one would expect 
that FPC and BC 
incorporations 
would be heavily 
represented by new 
companies rather 
than existing ones.   Consistent with this 
prediction, Figure 4 shows that over three-
quarters of the BC/FPC incorporations in 
California during 2012 represent what 
appear to be new corporations rather than 
corporations that either amended their 
9	
	
charter in accordance with the statute, or 
when through the formal conversion 
process.    
It is important to note, however, that the 
new incorporations number may be biased 
upwards, as it plausibly captures existing 
firms that – while 
newly created – 
actually succeeded 
to the business of 
preexisting firms 
through the asset 
sale or acquisition 
process.   That 




tended to vary 
considerably in 
age, ranging from 2 
months to 37 
years, with a 
relatively uniform 
distribution in 
between.  Although 
the numbers are 
admittedly small, it 
is interesting to note 
that at least some 
well established 
firms find it 
worthwhile to adopt 




oddity about the 
firms who adopted 
FPC/BC status by 
converting or 
amending their 
charters is their 
evidently strong 
preference for the BC form over the FPC 
form, as illustrated by Figure 6.  As the 
figure shows, none of the converting / 
amending firms appears to have opted for a 
FPC approach.  This is a bit surprising, 
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given the impression that the FPC is widely 
perceived to be a relatively modest 
departure from a traditional corporate form 
than is the BC. Although this evident 
regularity may be due to the possibility that 
new firms are more likely than established 
ones to want to attract investments from 
outsiders, or greater marketing visibility of 
BC proponents,17 at this stage the drivers 
behind this trend are unclear, and – as with 
all these data – the trend itself may well 
change or even reverse over time.  
 
So, What Now? 
 
Thus far, California’s and other states’ 
legislative experiments in social enterprise 
business forms remain decidedly a work in 
progress.  While there is obviously interest 
in these new corporate forms, judging by 
California’s experience, uptake rates have 
thus far been modest.  In many respects, 
this observation should not be too 
surprising, given the novelty of the area, 
the absence of developed case law, the lack 
of developed best practices in 
administering these sorts of business 
entities, and the understandable aversion 
that many have to being the first canary to 
fly into a new statutory cave.   Fully 
appreciating the implications of this new 
“wave” in corporate organization, as well as 
course adjustments that may be necessary, 
will obviously require more time to let the 
experiment percolate.   
As the experiment plays out, a number 
of unresolved issues are likely to receive 
considerable attention.  The first is one of 
measuring and assessing individual firms’ 
performance in fulfilling their articulated 
social purposes.  Unlike the standard 
measures for profitability (EPS, ROA, etc.), 
the markers of success in “enhancing 
sustainability” or “improving educational 
opportunities” (or other typical forms of 
commonly articulated purpose) are 
significantly less concrete, and they are 
thereby prone to more indeterminacies.  
Although reference to established third-
party standards might plausibly offer some 
discipline in the assessment process, that 
discipline is only as good as such standards 
are reliable – a factor that is still unknown.   
A second potential obstacle concerns 
the nature of the financial returns (and thus 
investment potential) from social 
entrepreneurship enterprises.  On first 
glance, a business organization’s 
simultaneous pursuit of a social goal 
alongside profit necessarily implies that the 
firm will (and indeed must) make marginal 
tradeoffs between profits and something else.  
It naturally follows that such a firm’s 
earnings would likely fall short of its for-
profit peers, resulting in a market discount.  
While the various reputational attractions 
that social enterprises promise (among 
employees, customers, creditors, and 
suppliers of capital) might go some 
distance to counteract that discount, it 
seems wildly optimistic to expect such 
factors to reverse it completely. 
That said, it is important to remember 
that capitalization discounts are not 
concomitant with investment returns. In 
fact, once a market discount (whatever its 
size) is fully incorporated into company 
valuation, it need not follow that the risk-
adjusted returns on that investment will lag 
behind similarly situated for-profits.  This is 
a significant consideration for social 
enterprises attempting to attract capital 
from institutional investors, which 
themselves are under an assortment of legal 
duties to maximize risk-constrained yields 
for their beneficiaries.   
Moreover, although it is often 
overlooked, it is important to keep in mind 
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that FPCs and BCs retain a real option to 
convert into for-profits (upon a 2/3 
shareholder vote), should the prevailing 
market environment become too 
unwelcoming.  This conversion option can 
build in a type of internal safety net for 
firm’s capital claimants, a factor that would 
be reflected in lower downside equity 
Betas, smaller credit spreads, and reduced 
values-at-risk than for similarly situated for-
profit organizations. Consequently, it is at 
least plausible that social entrepreneurship 
organizations would be more (not less) 
appealing investment targets on systematic 
risk grounds. 
Of course, much of this discussion (at 
least at present) is little more than idle 
speculation.  Testing, verifying, and/or 
falsifying these conjectures will demand 
more systematic access to (and analysis of) 
real-world data, across states, over time, 
and along numerous dimensions.  Thus far, 
there is little concentrated effort to collect, 
organize, and warehouse such data across 
(or even within) states.  Because such 
information itself has significant public 
benefits, moreover, it would seem 
imprudent to leave its collection and 
analysis to private entities (with private 
motives) or partisan advocates (with 
ideological commitments).  Respected 
academic institutions or non-partisan 
research centers are far more likely to be 
reliable and credible source for data, best 
practices, and policy relevant research on 
corporate form, social purpose, and 
entrepreneurship. The task of installing that 
infrastructure is something that we can 






























































































































































































































California FPC No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
California BC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Hawaii BC Unclear No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No
Illinois BC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Louisiana BC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Maryland BC No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
New Jersey BC Unclear No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
New York BC No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
South Carolina BC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Vermont BC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Virginia BC No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No
















6	 Cal.	 Corp.	 Code	 §	 202,	which	prescribes	 specific	 language	 for	 a	 general	 corporate	purpose,	 and	 specifically	
prohibits	expansions	of	that	purpose.	
7	Although	 thirty	 states	 currently	have	 such	 statutes,	 they	are	 absent	 from	both	 the	California	and	Delaware	
corporate	 codes.	 	 For	 a	 state‐by‐state	 accounting,	 see	 Jonathan	 Springer,	 Corporate	 Constituency	 Statutes:	
Hollow	Hopes	and	False	Fears,	1999	Ann.	Surv.	Am.	Law	85	(1999).		
8	 Cal.	 Corp.	 Code	 §	 2115.	 The	 Delaware	 Supreme	 Court	 declared	 Section	 2115	 to	 be	 unconstitutional	 on	
commerce	clause	grounds	in		VantagePoint	Venture	Partners	1996	v.	Examen,	Inc.,	871	A.2d	1108	(Del.	2005).		












13	 See,	 e.g.,	 Susan	Mac	Cormac	and	Heather	Haney,	New	Corporate	Forms:	One	Viable	 Solution	 to	Advancing	
Environmental	Sustainability,	24	J.	App.	Corp.	Fin.	49‐58	(2012).	
14	It	bears	noting,	however,	that	FPC‐like	statutes	have	also	recently	been	proposed	in	a	number	of	states.	
15	Many	thanks	to	the	California	Corporations	Commissioner’s	office	for	assistance	in	collecting	this	data.	
16	Many	of	the	19	BCs	incorporated	in	January,	for	example,	appear	to	have	been	executed	by	a	small	number	of	
attorneys,	which	may	be	a	byproduct	of	concerted	marketing	efforts	by	BC	proponents.	(This	is	but	one	of	many	
possibilities,	however,	and	the	data	does	not	currently	permit	testing	of	it).	
17	See	note	16,	supra.	
